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the enlarged EU based on two approaches. Inequality analysis based on the standard 
approach suggests that benefits are the most important factor reducing inequality in the 
majority of countries. The factor source decomposition approach, however, suggests that 
benefits play a negligible role and sometimes even contribute slightly positive to inequality. 
On the contrary, here taxes and social contributions are by far the most important 
contributors to income inequality reduction. We explain these partly contradictory results with 
the different normative focus of the two approaches and show that benefits have other aims 
than redistribution. Finally, our country clustering shows that the Eastern European countries 
do not form a distinguished group. The Central Eastern European countries group together 
with the Continental European countries and the Baltic States show similarities with some 
Southern European countries. 
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It is one of the main objectives of the European Union (EU) to enhance economic and
social cohesion both between and within member countries (Article 2 of the Treaty
on European Union). Nonetheless, there are sizeable di⁄erences across member
states in the levels of within country income inequality. This is true especially since
the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007, when in total 12 additional countries,
mostly from Eastern Europe, joined the EU. Inequality is usually measured in terms
of disposable income, which is determined by i) the pre-tax income distribution and
ii) various redistributive policies. From a policy perspective, it is important to
understand to what extent the di⁄erences in inequality levels between EU countries
are driven by di⁄erences in the market income distribution and to what extent they
are driven by di⁄erent designs of the welfare state. With respect to the recent EU
enlargement it is particularly interesting to see how the new member states compare
to the well-established welfare states of Western Europe.
The analysis of income inequality, the design of the welfare state and the size of
redistribution has a long tradition in economic and social science literature. Espe-
cially regarding the analysis of the development of income inequality across countries
and time, a large number of empirical studies exists (see Anand and Segal (2008)
for a recent overview). Due to data limitations, the development of the size of re-
distribution across countries and time is not as extensively analyzed as inequality.
However, since the availability of comparable micro data sets there has been much
progress in analyzing redistributive e⁄ects in cross-national comparison.
When assessing the overall distributional impact of di⁄erent tax bene￿t instru-
ments, one can generally distinguish two di⁄erent approaches in the literature. The
majority of micro studies measures e⁄ective redistribution of the tax bene￿t sys-
tem by taking either the relative or absolute change of inequality measures of the
pre-government and post-government income distribution (e.g., Mitchell (1991), Im-
mervoll et al. (2005), Mahler and Jesuit (2006), Whiteford (2008)). Based on a cer-
tain income accounting framework, this approach sequentially applies di⁄erent tax
bene￿t instruments and compares it with the counterfactual distribution without
the instrument in question. In the following, we will refer to this approach as the
standard approach of measuring e⁄ective redistribution.
Another possibility to assess the impact of di⁄erent income components such
as taxes and transfers on income inequality is the factor source decomposition ap-
1proach as suggested by Shorrocks (1982, 1983). As total disposable income can
be exhaustively decomposed into di⁄erent pre-tax income sources as well as taxes,
social insurance contributions and bene￿ts, it is possible to calculate the contribu-
tion (equalizing or disequalizing e⁄ect) of each factor to overall inequality in the
status quo. Here the inequality contribution of each factor component is determ-
ined simultaneously. With this decomposition approach it is not only possible to
determine the impact of taxes and transfers but also the inequality contribution of
self-employment and capital incomes as part of total income (e.g., Jenkins (1995),
J￿ntti (1997), Fr￿ssdorf et al. (2008)).
Obviously, di⁄erent approaches can lead to di⁄erent results, which in turn would
imply di⁄erent policy implications. Therefore, we use EU-SILC (Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions) micro data of 2007 to systematically compare the two
approaches with regard to the resulting redistributive e⁄ects of tax bene￿t systems.
The 2007 wave is the ￿rst to provide information on both gross and net incomes
for all 25 EU member states (except Malta). Thus, we do not only investigate
the redistributive importance of tax bene￿t instruments across countries, but also
whether the results di⁄er with respect to the underlying method. In the next step,
we cluster countries according to their design of the welfare state and the import-
ance of the pre-tax distribution. We investigate whether both approaches lead to
a robust country clustering. Particularly, we identify the positions of the (Eastern
European) new member states in the European inequality ordering.
Our results suggest that tax and transfer systems substantially reduce income in-
equality in all European countries. But the two measurement approaches described
above generate very di⁄erent, partly contradictory results. Inequality analysis based
on the standard approach suggests that bene￿ts are the most important factor re-
ducing inequality in the majority of countries. The factor source decomposition
approach, however, suggests that bene￿ts play a negligible role and sometimes even
slightly increase inequality. Here, taxes and social contributions are by far the most
important contributors to income inequality reduction. We explain these partly
contradictory results with the di⁄erent normative focus of the two approaches and
show that many bene￿ts seem have objectives other than reducing disposable in-
come inequality. With regard to the country clustering, we ￿nd that the Eastern
European countries do not form a distinguished group, as suggested in the political
sciences literature by, e.g., Fenger (2007). The Central Eastern European countries
group together with the Continental European countries and the Baltic states show
2similarities with some Southern European countries.
The setup of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data
and methodologies used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we explain the dif-
ferent European welfare state designs and their distributional outcomes. Section
4 presents the results of the redistributive e⁄ects of tax bene￿t instruments based
on the standard and decomposition approach. Section 5 reports the results of our
hierarchical cluster analysis. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main results
and discussing their implications.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Data
The EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) mi-
cro data set provides harmonized cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional
micro data on income and social exclusion in European countries. Since 2005, the
dataset covers the EU-25 member states (except Malta), plus Norway and Iceland,
and it is the largest comparative survey of European income and living conditions.
Our analysis is based on the 2007 EU-SILC wave which is the ￿rst wave with gross
income information for all 26 countries.
For our analysis of the impacts of di⁄erent sources of income it is used that indi-
vidual income data can be split into di⁄erent categories. These are factor incomes
(earnings, income from self-employment and capital incomes), income taxes, social
security contributions (employer and employee) and social transfers. In order to
make incomes comparable across countries, we adjust national income amounts by
the multilateral current purchasing power parities provided by Eurostat. Through-
out the analysis, we use equivalized incomes to compensate for di⁄erent household
structures and possible economies of scales within households.1
In our application, overall equivalized disposable household income (DPI) is ex-
haustively decomposed into its equivalized components: factor income, income taxes,
social insurance contributions, social bene￿ts and public pensions, based on the fol-
1For each person, the equivalized (per-capita) total net income is its household total net income
divided by the equivalized household size according to the modi￿ed OECD scale, which assigns a
weight of 1.0 to the head of household, 0.5 to every household member aged 14 or more and 0.3
to each child aged less than 14. Summing up the individual weights gives the household speci￿c
equivalence factor.
3lowing identity:
DPI = (original income + SIC employer)
| {z }
factor income
￿ taxes ￿ SIC + benefits + pensions
(1)
Note that our concept of factor income includes social insurance contributions paid
by the employer as they can be very di⁄erent across countries. We also consider the
role of public pensions separately because one can argue that public pensions are not
really part of the redistributive system but should rather be seen as deferred earnings
or the result of compulsory savings. This function of public pensions is particularly
true for countries which apply insurance-based systems. Furthermore, the analysis
only allocates those taxes and bene￿ts that can reasonably attributed to households.
Therefore, corporate taxes as well as some types of government expenditures such as
expenditure on defense are not considered. Due to data limitations, indirect taxes
and in-kind bene￿ts can not be taken into account, either.
2.2 Inequality measurement
Consider a population of n persons (or households), i = 1;:::n, with xi as the income




Following Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969), a relative measure of inequality can be
derived from a relationship between inequality, mean income and social welfare as:




where W(x) is the average or mean social welfare function (see Maasoumi (1999)).















where F is the CDF of income and ￿ being a parameter indicating the sensitivity
towards a particular part of the income distribution.2 The discretized formula of
2See, e.g., Cowell and Kuga (1981). The more positive (negative) ￿ is, the more sensitive I￿
is to changes at the top (bottom) of the income distribution.
4the GE family used for empirical applications is given by
I￿ = GE(￿) =
8
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(4)
GE(0) is also known as the mean log deviation and GE(1) as the Theil index (see
Theil (1967)). The GE measures of inequality can be interpreted in an economic way
(Dahlby (1987)) using the Harsanyi (1953, 1977) framework which is a particular
form of utilitarianism based on the veil of ignorance and equiprobability assumption
(expected utility: EU = 1
n
P
U(xi) with U a Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
with U0 > 0 and U￿ < 0). Using a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function it has been shown that
I￿ =







xU0(x) is an approximation to the relative risk premium divided by the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in the Harsanyi framework.
2.3 Standard accounting approach
To determine the e⁄ective distributional impact of di⁄erent tax bene￿t instruments,
we will ￿rst use what we call the standard approach of analyzing the distribution
and redistribution. For this approach we have to de￿ne di⁄erent income concepts at
di⁄erent stages of redistribution. Following Mitchell (1991) and Whiteford (2008),
among others, we apply an accounting framework for household income which is illus-
trated in Figure 1. Accordingly, income from wages and salaries, self-employment,
investment incomes and in our case also employer·s social contributions sum to
￿factor income￿ , the inclusion of state retirement pensions then gives ￿market in-
come￿ . Market income plus all di⁄erent types of cash bene￿ts accounts to ￿gross
income￿ , subtracting personal income taxes gives post-tax income and ￿nally sub-
tracting social insurance contributions results in ￿cash disposable income￿ , respect-
ively. All income concepts are based on equivalized incomes in order to account
5for di⁄erent household structures. With the accounting framework, a number of
measures of the redistributive impact of the tax bene￿t system can be constructed
by comparing inequality measures at the di⁄erent stages of household income. For
instance, the relative redistribution achieved by social bene￿ts equals the percent-





The impact of taxes is evaluated by comparing the inequality of the distribution of
equivalized gross incomes and post-tax incomes and so on.
Figure 1: Income Accounting Framework
However, the framework is static and linear which implies a number of limita-
tions. For example, there are no interactions between the di⁄erent stages of redis-
tribution. In reality, however, in some countries bene￿ts might also be taxable. By
￿rst adding bene￿ts to factor income, we necessarily overestimate the redistributive
e⁄ects of bene￿ts in such countries (Ferrarini and Nelson (2003); Mahler and Jesuit
(2006)). Due to this sensitivity of the redistributive measures with regard to the
6de￿nition of pre-instrument income, Immervoll et al. (2005) follow a slightly di⁄er-
ent approach which we also apply as a robustness check of our results. For each tax
or bene￿t they start from the hypothetical situation without the instrument in ques-
tion (DPI - instrument) and ask by how much inequality is reduced by introducing
it.
2.4 Factor source decomposition approach
As total income is usually composed from several sources, it is useful to express
total inequality as the sum of these factor￿ s contributions (Shorrocks (1982, 1983)).
The exact decomposition procedure depends on the measure of inequality used, but
whichever measure is used must naturally be decomposable and, given the large
number of income sources, it must be de￿ned for zero incomes. In practice, the
easiest measure to decompose in this way is GE(2) which can also be expressed as































Suppose total income X can be written as the sum of f = 1;:::;K di⁄erent
income sources xf: x =
K P
f=1
xf and ￿f is the correlation between x and xf and
￿f =
xf
x is is f0s factor share.
















2 denotes the inequality for factor source f and Sf the (absolute)
contribution of factor f to total inequality. Note that income source f provides a
disequalizing e⁄ect if Sf > 0, and an equalizing e⁄ect if Sf < 0. sf =
Sf
I is the
relative contribution of f to total inequality and indicates the importance of f:
73 Welfare state designs in Europe
3.1 Welfare State Typologies
As we are interested to classify the European countries into groups with certain
characteristics, we almost necessarily have to refer to the famous welfare state ty-
pologies of the political science literature. The grouping of countries according to
these typologies will be the reference point in the following analysis. Although
all European countries have an individual design for their tax bene￿t system, it
is possible to classify the countries into di⁄erent welfare state regimes with sim-
ilar institutional structures. The classical typology of welfare states goes back to
Esping-Andersen (1990) who di⁄erentiates between three types of welfare states:
conservative (Continental Europe), social-democratic (Nordic Europe) and liberal
(Anglo-Saxon). Ferrera (1996) further adds a fourth category (Southern or Medi-
terranean) to this typology.3 The main conceptional features of these welfare state
types are summarized in Table 1.
Liberal Conservative Social-Democratic Southern
Region Anglo-Saxon Continental Nordic Mediterranean
Countries IR, UK AT, BE, FR, GE, LU, NL DK, FI, NO, SW CY, GR, IT, PT, SP
Social security means-tested contribution based universal, equal bene￿ts contribution based
Social ex-
penditure
low high high low
Tax rates low high high low
Tax revenue middle high high low
SIC low (Beveridge) high (Bismarck) middle (Beveridge) middle (Bismarck)
Redistribution middle high high low
Participation
women
high low high low
Table 1: Typology of welfare states
Anglo-Saxon countries (￿liberal￿welfare states) provide a minimum level of so-
cial protection (minimal subsistence level) based on universal, mean-tested bene￿ts.
People are encouraged to work (e.g. through the working families tax credit) and
labor force participation is high. Tax rates and social insurance contributions are
rather low. The state encourages private insurance systems through tax exemptions.
3See Arts and Gelissen (2002) for an overview. In Esping-Andersen (1990), these countries are
treated as immature conservative welfare states.
8In this regime, market institutions are preferred to state interventions. Continental
countries (￿conservative￿or ￿corporatist￿welfare states)4 use bene￿ts that depend
on the history of paid contributions (rather than on the actual need for the bene-
￿t) and aim at replicating the former income of employees (Bismarckian system).
These generous schemes are ￿nanced through rather high compulsory contributions.
Further on, high taxes ensure a rather high level of redistribution through vari-
ous other public instruments. Nordic countries (￿social-democratic￿welfare states)
apply even higher taxes but lower contributions for a similarly high level of redistri-
bution. However, they use universal bene￿ts with equal amounts for every citizen,
i.e. not depending on the contribution history (Beveridgean system). These systems
aim at providing a high level of social protection while simultaneously encouraging
a high labor force participation through various instruments of active labor market
policies and the provision of extensive child care. Mediterranean countries (￿South-
ern￿welfare states) provide a rather low level of social security (comparable to the
Anglo-Saxon countries) based on low levels of taxes and redistribution. However,
they also use contribution-based Bismarckian social insurance systems providing
bene￿ts depending on the level of previously earned income (like the Continental
countries).
As we speci￿cally look at the new EU member states we are interested in at-
tempts to integrate these within the traditional welfare state typology. In fact,
there are several authors in the political and social science literature who try to ap-
ply the welfare regime typology to Eastern European countries. Deacon (1993), for
example, labeled these countries as ￿ post-communist conservative corporatist￿and
expected that they will form a distinct group in the welfare state typology. Esping-
Andersen (1996) rejected this idea of a ￿ new￿welfare state category and argued
that the di⁄erences between these countries and the traditional welfare states were
only of transitional nature. More recently, Deacon (2000) and Ferge (2001), again
support the view of a separated welfare state group. Fenger (2007) then applied
a hierarchical cluster analysis based on a series of variables describing character-
istics of governmental programmes, social situation and political participation to
analyze if the post-communist welfare states of Central and Eastern Europe can be
integrated in the traditional welfare state typology. His analysis suggests that the
Eastern European welfare states can be clearly distinguished from the traditional
4The ￿conservative￿model origins from the in￿ uence of the Catholic Church and is further on
characterized by the fostering of traditional family structures.
9European welfare states.
These typologies stem from the political and social sciences literature. They are
based on the conceptional design of the welfare states and use macro level variables
to group the countries. It is also possible to apply this typology to economic out-
comes as well. In the following sections, the outcome of the welfare state in the
EU member states is analyzed with respect to several economic indicators, such as
income inequality, redistribution and the composition of household income. We will
then in Section 5 perform a hierarchical cluster analysis based on these micro level
outcome variables in order to group the European countries and check (a) whether
the classical typology for Western Europe is con￿rmed with this approach and (b)
where the new member states ￿t in.
3.2 Income Distribution and Redistribution
The previous paragraph explained the welfare state typology from the political and
social science literature which is based on the conceptual design of the welfare state.
Now we look at the income distribution and overall redistribution as an outcome
of the welfare state, to illustrate the variation in overall inequality levels and re-
distribution across EU member states. In this section, we use the Gini coe¢ cient
as our measure of inequality because of its readily intuitive interpretation and its
popularity in comparable micro studies.
The variation in inequality levels in factor incomes (green + orange + blue
bar), market incomes (green + orange bar) and disposable income (green bar) is
also illustrated in Figure 2, where countries are sorted in ascending order of the
inequality in disposable incomes. The red and blue areas of the Figure also show
the very di⁄erent extent of redistribution schemes across EU member states, here
illustrated by the absolute di⁄erence in Gini coe¢ cients. Overall redistribution is
particularly high in the Nordic countries, some Continental countries, Hungary and
Slovenia which achieve substantially better equality rankings in disposable income
as opposed to factor income. It is rather low in Cyprus and Iceland, as well as in
the Baltic States.
Looking at the inequality of factor incomes, huge disparities among the European
countries emerge, with Gini coe¢ cients ranging from 0.38 in Iceland to 0.54 in Por-
tugal. Factor income inequality is comparatively high in the Anglo-Saxon countries
as well as in Lithuania, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Hungary (>0.50). Rather
10low inequality levels can be found in Cyprus, Iceland, the Slovak Republic and Slove-
nia. Therefore, with regard to factor income inequality we cannot identify the welfare
state typology outlined above. Particularly within the group of Eastern European
countries there are substantial di⁄erences. The group encompasses countries with
very high market inequality such as Hungary and Poland but also countries with
comparatively low market inequality such as the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The
di⁄erence between the Gini coe¢ cients of factor income and the ones of market in-
come demonstrates the di⁄erent strength of the redistributive character of pensions
across European countries. It emerges, that pensions have huge redistributive power
in the Continental countries such as France, Germany and Austria, who now achieve
a substantial higher rank regarding the equality of incomes. This is also true for
Poland and the Czech Republic. On the other hand the inclusion of pensions leads
to a signi￿cant lower equality ranking of the Baltic states and Denmark.
Looking at the inequality of equivalized disposable income (DPI), ￿rst of all,
it should be noted, that post-government inequality is signi￿cantly lower than the
pre-government inequality, indicating a substantial degree of redistribution in all
countries. Also, the ranking of countries in transition from factor to disposable
income changes substantially. Here the group of Nordic countries can be identi￿ed
with very low inequality levels (around 0.25) and also the Central Eastern European
countries Slovenia, the Slovak and the Czech Republic display low disposable income
inequalities. On the other hand, the distribution of post-government income is
comparatively unequal in the Baltic, Southern and Anglo-Saxon countries (>0.30).
Whereas the factor income inequality suggests a very heterogeneous country clus-
tering, with regard to disposable income inequality, the importance of public pension
schemes and overall redistribution, for the EU-15 countries we ￿nd a very similar
country clustering as suggested by welfare state typology outlined above. However,
the Eastern European member states do not really form a homogeneous group of
countries. On the one hand, there are the Baltic States which are characterized by
high factor income inequality, low redistribution and high inequality in disposable
incomes. They show some similarities with the Southern European countries, still,
their level of redistribution is substantially lower. Hungary and Poland show high
factor income inequalities, however, combined with more extensive redistribution
schemes and therefore comparatively lower inequality in disposable incomes. The
other countries Slovenia, the Slovak and Czech Republic represent low inequality in





































Figure 2: Gini Income Inequality and absolute Redistribution
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC.
incomes. Therefore, with regard to inequality and overall redistribution levels, they
show similar characteristics as the Nordic and Continental countries.
3.3 Composition of household income
As a next step we investigate in how far the importance of di⁄erent components of
the redistributive system varies across European countries. Figure 3 illustrates the
composition of total disposable income in terms of original factor income, income
taxes, social contributions, cash bene￿ts and public pensions. We also show the
importance of employer·s social contributions in disposable income separately in
order to visualize our concept of factor income. All incomes are equivalized. It
should be noted that this perspective does not allow to identify government budget
de￿cits or surpluses because major parts government spending and ￿nancing are
not considered. According to Immervoll et al. (2005), results as in Figure 3 can be
interpreted as showing how much factor income is necessary to achieve a certain
level of disposable income and how much is deducted by taxes and contributions
and added by bene￿ts. If the share of factor income is around 100%, then the state
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Figure 3: Factor Shares of Tax Bene￿t Instruments
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC.
If we look at factor income without the social contributions of the employer, the
majority of countries reveals shares in disposable income close to 100%. The share
of factor income is signi￿cantly larger than 105% only in Denmark, Iceland and the
Netherlands, which means that in these countries the sum of deductions outweighs
the sum of bene￿ts. In Cyprus, France, Hungary and the Slovak Republic the share
is less than 95%, therefore on average people receive more bene￿ts than they pay as
contributions and bene￿ts. If we consider the social contributions by the employer
as part of the factor income, in all countries except Cyprus the share of factor income
is signi￿cantly higher than 100%. Also, the economic weight of employer·s social
contributions varies substantially across countries: From a share of 8.3% in Ireland
to 33.2% in Belgium. With respect to the overall importance of the other income
sources, total social contributions (SIC) make up a greater proportion of equivalized
disposable income than income taxes in almost all countries. On average their share
in disposable income is about 10 percentage points higher. Exceptions are the Nordic
countries and Poland where income taxes play a more important role. The high
5Note that indirect taxes are not taken into account here. This explains why it is possible that
the share of factor income in overall income may be below 100%.
13share of social contributions may seem surprising but is explained by the fact that
contributions include both, employer and employee contributions. On the bene￿t
side, with an average share of 18% the economic weight of public pensions exceeds the
importance of the rest of social bene￿ts (on average 10%). The opposite is true only
in Denmark, Ireland and Norway. Also, Figure 3 suggests that taxes generally have
a higher economic weight than social bene￿ts. Here the only exceptions are Ireland,
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Looking at the importance of particular income
components across countries, the share of public pensions in disposable income is
particularly high in some Continental countries (Austria, France, Germany) as well
as in the Southern European countries Italy, Greece and Portugal (>20%). They
reveal low importance in Iceland, Ireland, Cyprus and the Baltic States. Social
bene￿ts are most important in the Nordic countries, but also in Hungary and Ireland
(>15%). They only make up a small part of disposable income in Southern European
countries, which could also be expected from the welfare state typology. With regard
to the burden side, the share of taxes is particularly high in the Nordic countries and
Iceland and it is low in the Central Eastern European countries Slovak Republic,
Slovenia and the Czech Republic as well as in Cyprus. Social contributions, on
the contrary, are most important in the Continental countries such as Netherlands,
Belgium, France and Germany, as it is also suggested by the welfare state typology
outlined above. Their share is also relatively high in Slovenia, the Slovak and Czech
Republic, whose share of income taxes is rather low.
Overall, the importance of di⁄erent tax bene￿t components as measured by the
micro composition of disposable income again suggests a similar clustering for the
EU-15 countries, as suggested by the political and social science welfare state typolo-
gies. But again, the Eastern European countries do not seem to form a homogeneous
and distinct group. With regard to the importance of tax bene￿t components in
disposable income, Slovenia, the Slovak and Czech Republic reveal similarities, as
does the group of the Baltic states. Poland and Hungary do not really ￿t into
either of these two groups but rather group together with some traditional EU-15
welfare states. However, this analysis only considers the economic importance of
tax bene￿t instruments in disposable income and does not take into account their
particular distribution across households and therefore their redistributive impact
on the distribution of incomes. This is what the following section deals with.
144 Inequality Contribution of Tax Bene￿t Instru-
ments
In this section, we look at the redistributive importance of the di⁄erent tax bene￿t
instruments across countries. To determine the redistributive impact of tax bene￿t
instruments we need an inequality measure which is naturally decomposable. As
outlined in Section 2, we refer to the GE measures of inequality. More speci￿c-
ally, we use the GE(2) because it is naturally decomposable and also de￿ned for
zero incomes. Furthermore, we apply two di⁄erent approaches to measure the re-
distributive impact of taxes and bene￿ts. First, we use the standard approach of
distributional analysis which bases on a sequential accounting framework. Second,
we apply the factor source decomposition approach as suggested by Shorrocks (1982,
1983) which determines the contribution of each tax bene￿t instrument to inequality
in disposable incomes simultaneously. Finally, we compare the results and discuss
the di⁄erences.
4.1 Standard Accounting Approach
To analyze the redistributive impact of tax bene￿t instruments based on the stand-
ard accounting approach, we ￿rst compute the GE(2) inequality measures for the
di⁄erent income concepts as illustrated in Figure 1. The results are presented on the
left hand side of Table 2. By taking the percentage change between each of the con-
secutive inequality measures, we then compute the relative redistributive e⁄ect of
the di⁄erent tax bene￿t instruments. When comparing the GE(2) inequality meas-
ures with the Gini coe¢ cients in Section 3, there are some important di⁄erences in
the rankings of the countries. Particularly for the GE(2) inequality in disposable in-
come it stands out that Denmark and Finland - which could be considered as rather
equal with regard to the Gini Coe¢ cients - now belong to the group of unequal
countries. In addition, the Anglo-Saxon countries, Iceland, Cyprus and Estonia now
achieve worse equality rankings. On the other hand, the Southern countries Spain,
Greece and Italy display relatively more equal distributions of income, when using
the GE(2) inequality measure. It might seem surprising that the inequality in dis-
posable income in the Nordic countries such as Denmark and Finland is higher than
in Italy and Spain. The reason for the di⁄erence is the fact that the GE(2) measure
15is particularly sensitive to changes at the top of the income distribution.6
However, here we are not interested in the overall redistributive e⁄ect of the
tax bene￿t system as a whole, but in the redistributive importance of the main tax
bene￿t instruments, such as public pensions, social bene￿ts, incomes taxes and social
insurance contributions. The amount of redistribution achieved by a certain tax
bene￿t instrument is measured as the percentage change between two consecutive
income concepts as suggested by Figure 1. The results are presented at the right
hand side of Table 2, which shows the results of the redistributive e⁄ects of di⁄erent
tax bene￿t instruments for 26 European countries.
Regarding the overall redistributive importance of the di⁄erent instruments, it
￿rst becomes obvious that public pensions are responsible for most of the reduction
in income inequality of factor incomes. Exceptions are the Anglo-Saxon countries
as well as Denmark and Norway. With respect to the other redistributive instru-
ments, in half of the countries bene￿ts play a more important role than income
taxes, in the other countries it is the other way round. Also, the results suggest that
social contributions are least important in redistributing income in almost all EU
member states. In some countries the inclusion of social contributions even leads to
an increase in income inequality implying a regressive incidence. Only in Slovenia
contributions play the most important role in redistributing income. In Belgium,
France, Lithuania and Poland they are more important than income taxes. With
respect to the redistributive importance of single welfare state components across
countries, public pensions are particularly important in the Continental countries
(France, Austria and Germany) as well as in the Slovak Republic, Poland and Italy
(around 40%). They lead to comparatively low inequality reductions in Cyprus,
Iceland, the Anglo-Saxon countries and in the Baltic States. Bene￿ts have high re-
distributive e⁄ects in the Nordic countries, Ireland and Hungary, the opposite is true
for the Southern European countries and the Baltic States. Inequality reduction in-
duced by income taxes is relatively high in the UK, Hungary and Italy (>25%), and
low in Poland, Iceland and Cyprus and Denmark (<10%). Finally, social contribu-
6There are more observations at the very top of the distribution in the data for the Nordic
countries and the spread of these observations is also larger. In order to tackle this problem
we applied top-coding and trimming to the data at the top and recomputed all measures. The
ranking of the countries with respect to the overall level of inequality changes into the direction of
the results reported for the Gini coe¢ cient in Section 3.2. The results for the redistributive e⁄ect
as well as the inequality contributions in the next section, however, remain qualitatively the same.
Therefore, we decided to report the results for the uncoded data as any coding is always somewhat
arbitrary.
16tions have high redistributive e⁄ects in Slovenia, France, Belgium and Hungary. On
the other hand they lead to substantial increases in inequality in Germany, Cyprus,
Estonia and Iceland (<-10%).
GE(2) Inequality Redistributive E⁄ects of Instruments
% change in GE(2)
Factor Market Gross Post-tax DPI Pensions Bene￿ts Taxes SIC
EU 0.64 0.44 0.37 0.30 0.31 31.80 14.92 18.31 -1.32
AT 0.47 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.16 39.20 20.57 18.11 11.95
BE 0.42 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.15 31.75 23.44 11.37 20.87
CY 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.32 10.09 6.35 9.33 -12.38
CZ 0.45 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.17 33.40 18.41 22.88 7.48
DE 0.53 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.26 38.05 19.00 14.69 -13.65
DK 0.62 0.47 0.33 0.30 0.28 24.87 30.17 9.52 4.22
EE 0.70 0.54 0.50 0.42 0.46 22.74 8.44 15.81 -11.44
ES 0.36 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.20 34.48 8.69 11.05 -0.78
FI 0.57 0.41 0.30 0.24 0.25 28.48 25.92 20.31 -6.05
FR 0.58 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.18 39.93 18.93 13.87 24.86
GR 0.63 0.42 0.40 0.31 0.27 32.40 5.54 22.39 14.11
HU 0.57 0.36 0.27 0.20 0.16 37.03 23.76 26.46 19.43
IE 0.67 0.54 0.39 0.30 0.30 18.52 28.50 22.17 0.04
IS 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.29 16.88 12.53 5.37 -10.30
IT 0.52 0.32 0.31 0.23 0.24 38.25 4.28 25.02 -3.01
LT 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.25 23.26 9.68 13.94 16.91
LU 0.48 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.18 34.95 18.83 24.96 3.53
LV 0.47 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.28 21.73 9.79 10.44 6.64
NL 0.48 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.24 30.87 18.69 16.36 -5.88
NO 0.40 0.28 0.19 0.15 0.14 28.72 32.55 20.33 7.04
PL 0.63 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.26 40.65 16.54 1.98 13.35
PT 0.75 0.55 0.49 0.40 0.34 27.35 9.79 19.79 13.04
SE 0.45 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.13 34.65 29.37 20.72 18.87
SI 0.37 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.09 33.70 21.44 19.24 40.05
SK 0.31 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 41.01 15.52 12.81 10.06
UK 0.73 0.56 0.46 0.33 0.36 23.19 16.92 28.31 -7.73
Table 2: GE(2) Inequality Measures and Redistributive Instruments
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC.
Although we ￿nd some hints to country clustering in the case of public pensions
and social bene￿ts, we cannot really identify certain welfare state groups with regard
to the burden side of the redistributive system. In fact, we ￿nd a rather arbitrary
ranking of countries. Note, that the redistributive importance of instruments across
17countries does not fully corresponds to the economic weight of these instruments
as outlined in the previous Section. On the contrary, this standard approach of
redistributional analysis suggests that public pensions are the most important source
of inequality reduction, bene￿ts and taxes are on average similarly important, and
contributions only lead to signi￿cant inequality reduction in a small set of European
countries.
As argued above, the results for the redistributive impact of single tax bene￿t
instruments may be sensitive with respect to the assumed sequence of instruments of
the income accounting framework. Therefore we also followed the approach sugges-
ted by Immervoll et al. (2005) and started for each instrument from the hypothetical
situation without the instrument in question (DPI - instrument) and ask by how
much inequality is reduced by introducing it. Using this approach instead of the
standard approach, however, did not qualitatively change the results. As expected,
it only lowers the size of the redistributive e⁄ect of bene￿ts.
4.2 Decomposition Approach
This section reports the results of the inequality decomposition analysis by factor
components as suggested by Shorrocks, i.e. determining the relative inequality con-
tribution sf of the di⁄erent tax bene￿t instruments to overall inequality. The results
are illustrated in Figure 4. It becomes evident, that the results substantially di⁄er
from the previous analysis based on the standard accounting approach. In almost all
countries income taxes and social contributions are by far the most important source
of income inequality reductions, the contribution of bene￿ts is almost negligible.
The results reveal that interestingly, while taxes and social insurance contribu-
tions have a signi￿cant equalizing e⁄ect in all countries, the e⁄ect of social bene￿ts
and public pensions is not so clear across countries. Particularly, whereas taxes and
contributions reduce income inequality by on average about 30%, social bene￿ts do
not seem to have any signi￿cant impact on inequality (<5% in all countries except
Cyprus and Sweden), also the in￿ uence of public pensions is comparatively small.
In fact, in the majority of countries public pensions have disequalizing e⁄ects on
the inequality in disposable incomes. On average they increase inequality by 6%.
The positive e⁄ect of public pensions on inequality is particularly large in Austria,
Portugal and Cyprus (>20%). According to this factor source decomposition ap-



































Figure 4: Relative Inequality Contribution of Tax Bene￿t Instruments
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC. Note that values above (below) 0 represent
a disequalizing (equalizing) impact on income inequality in disposable incomes.
Estonia, Denmark and Lithuania. Also, social bene￿ts positively contribute to the
inequality in disposable incomes in at least seven countries. The disequalizing e⁄ect
is particularly evident in the Baltic States and Cyprus. Social bene￿ts only have
noteworthy equalizing e⁄ects in the Nordic countries, Slovenia, the Czech Republic,
Austria and the Netherlands (>3%). With regard to the burden side, the equalizing
e⁄ect of income taxes is highest in the Nordic Countries. However, in Greece, Italy,
Hungary, Poland and the UK taxes also reduce inequality by more then 40%, as
suggested by the Shorrocks decomposition method. The equalizing e⁄ect of taxes is
comparatively small in Cyprus, Latvia and the Slovak Republic. Regarding the in-
equality contribution of social contributions, the equalizing e⁄ect is particularly high
in Slovenia, Belgium, France and Latvia (>40%). The e⁄ect is small in Portugal,
Cyprus, Iceland, Denmark and the Anglo Saxon countries.
Again, we ￿nd some hints for a certain welfare state clustering of countries.
Speci￿cally the Nordic countries reveal similarities in the size of the redistributive
contribution of the di⁄erent tax bene￿t instruments. Also the Anglo-Saxon countries
19and the Baltic states seem to form a rather homogeneous group with regard to
the overall inequality contribution of the di⁄erent tax bene￿t instruments. The
hierarchical cluster analysis in Section 5 will help to identify more exactly groups of
countries with respect to the redistributive character of tax bene￿t instruments.
4.3 Discussion of the Results
The two approaches seem to lead to partly contradictory results which would im-
ply very di⁄erent policy implications - especially with respect to the importance
of bene￿ts for redistributing income. Why do we ￿nd substantial di⁄erences in
the redistributive importance of tax bene￿t instruments across the two approaches,
although both approaches are based on the same inequality measure? Both ap-
proaches are used in the literature and our results are in line with the respective
studies. In fact, studies analyzing the impact of tax bene￿t instruments based on
the standard approach generally ￿nd that bene￿ts are the most important source of
inequality reduction (e.g., Immervoll et al. (2005), Mahler and Jesuit (2006), White-
ford (2008)). On the other hand, the results of the factor source decomposition (e.g.
Jenkins (1995) and J￿ntti (1997)) suggest that taxes have a larger contribution to
inequality in disposable incomes.
First, an important di⁄erence between the two approaches is that the standard
approach applies tax bene￿t instruments sequentially whereas the decomposition
approach accounts for them simultaneously. Second, in order to further investigate
the sources of the di⁄erences, we present the di⁄erent components which determine
the relative inequality contribution of Shorrock·s decomposition analysis. As equa-
tion 8 suggests, the size of a factor·s relative inequality contribution (sf) depends on
its within factor inequality (I
f
2), the income share (￿f) of the corresponding factor
source f and its correlation with disposable income (￿f). From Table 3 it becomes
obvious that, in those countries where bene￿ts positively contribute to inequality,
the correlation coe¢ cient ￿f has a positive sign. The opposite is true for the other
countries, where they have an equalizing e⁄ect. However, the correlation between
disposable income and social bene￿ts is weak. For example, if the EU is seen as
a single economic unit, the correlation is almost equal to zero. The correlation
between disposable income and public pensions is rather small as well. Taxes, on
the other hand show a substantial negative correlation with disposable incomes in
all countries. Furthermore, the income share of bene￿ts is smaller than that of taxes
20or contributions in absolute terms. However, the within inequality for bene￿ts (and
pensions) is as high as that for tax payments which can be explained due to the
large share of people not paying taxes (receiving bene￿ts). The within inequality of
social contributions is much lower for most countries and closer to the one of factor
income. This further break-down of the decomposition results reveals, that the neg-
ligible e⁄ect of social bene￿ts on income inequality is due to the e⁄ect that they
are hardly correlated with income in most countries. Only the liberal welfare states
of Ireland and the UK that mainly rely on means-tested bene￿ts show a signi￿cant
negative correlation of bene￿ts with disposable income (together with a low factor
share).
Our ￿nding that bene￿ts account for a positive or negligible share of total in-
equality in most countries - as revealed by the inequality decomposition above -
is perfectly consistent with our earlier ￿nding that bene￿ts on the whole reduced
income inequality - as revealed by the standard approach to distributional analysis
in Section 4.1. In a related context, Stark et al. (1986) illustrate similar results
with a simple chemical experiment in which a highly concentrated solution is mixed
with a less (but still positively) concentrated one. Although the resulting mixture
will be less concentrated than the original, the added solution is still responsible
for a part of the concentration of the ￿nal mix. Therefore, unless the correlation
between bene￿ts and disposable incomes is negative, bene￿ts will always account
for a non-negative share of total income inequality. To put it more technically, in
order to ￿nd an unique decomposition rule for any inequality measure, Shorrocks
(1982) imposed the assumption of the normalization of equal factor distributions.
This restriction implies that according to Shorrocks decomposition method, equally
distributed lump sum transfers do not contribute to overall inequality. However,
most aggregate inequality measures satisfy the axiom that such equally distributed
transfers (i.e. which are relatively higher for lower incomes) reduce aggregate in-
equality whereas proportional transfers do not change it. This axiom also holds
for the GE(2) measure. Within the standard approach, therefore, equally distrib-
uted transfers imply an inequality reduction. In the decomposition approach, such
transfers have a zero inequality contribution because their correlation with dispos-
able income is zero. In this framework, an income component has to be higher
in absolute terms for lower incomes in order to achieve a negative contribution to
overall inequality. Therefore, these two di⁄erent normative foundations of the two




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22These di⁄ering results have important implications for the policy conclusions. It
would be wrong to conclude from their positive contribution to overall inequality
in the Shorrocks approach that bene￿ts increase inequality and should therefore,
for instance, be abolished. This positive contribution has to be interpreted as the
contribution of the components of the tax bene￿t system to overall inequality (like
the di⁄erent solutions to the mixture in the chemical example) but not as the e⁄ect
of a change in this instrument. Abolishing the bene￿ts would increase inequality, as
shown by the sequential approach. Nonetheless, from the decomposition approach
and due to the rather weak correlation of bene￿ts and disposable income it can be
learned that bene￿ts seem to have other objectives than income redistribution (e.g.
support of families with children or elderly people).
>From a policy perspective, it is important to take into account the results from
both approaches. The standard approach (and the literature applying it) suggests
that bene￿ts are the most important source of income redistribution. However,
the decomposition approach quali￿es this view by taking the (weak) correlation
into account and therefore highlights the di⁄erent functions of taxes and bene￿ts
for redistributing income. It is interesting to see how di⁄erent countries use these
di⁄erent measures. Therefore, in the next step, we perform a cluster analysis to
classify countries with respect to similarities in their tax bene￿t systems.
5 Cluster Analysis
As outlined above, we are particularly interested in how the new member states can
be integrated in the existing welfare state typology when focusing on outcome vari-
ables in terms of the redistributive e⁄ects of di⁄erent tax bene￿t systems. Therefore,
we conduct a hierarchical cluster analysis to group countries that have similar char-
acteristics across a set of variables. When performing a cluster analysis, a number of
technical decisions have to be made. First, all variables have been standardized from
0 to 1 using z-scores, to prevent that the results are driven by large absolute values
of some variables. Our method of grouping the countries is the common Ward￿ s
linkage, which combines such clusters which minimally increase the squared sum of
errors. Our results will be illustrated in so-called dendrograms, which graphically
present the information concerning which observations are grouped together at vari-
ous levels of (dis)similarity. At the bottom of the dendrogram, each observation is
23considered as its own cluster. Vertical lines extend up for each observation, and
at various (dis)similarity values these lines are connected to the lines from other
observations with a horizontal line. The observations continue to combine, until,
at the top of the dendrogram, all observations are grouped together. The height
of the vertical lines and the range of the (dis)similarity axis give visual clues about
the strength of the clustering. In our case, the measure for the distance between
cases is the common ￿ squared Euclidean￿ . Generally, long vertical lines indicate more









































ATFR HU CZ LUSK SI BEDE FI NL DKNO SE IE UK CY EE LT LV IS ES PLGR PT IT
Dendrogram for ge2_Standard_Approach cluster analysis
Figure 5: Cluster Analysis of Redistributive E⁄ects based on Standard Approach
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC.
First, we perform a cluster analysis on the basis of the redistributive e⁄ects of tax
bene￿t instruments, as computed by the % change in GE(2) combined with the im-
portance of pre-government income inequality and the economic weight of the di⁄er-
ent components. The dendrogram is illustrated in Figure 5. To the very right of the
dendrogram we see the Southern European countries (IT, PT, ES, GR) and Poland
which group together with the Baltic countries (LT, LV, EE), Iceland and Cyprus.
As illustrated by a comparatively high dissimilarity measure, this group of countries
7Note that the general clustering results presented here are robust to di⁄erent linkage or dis-
similarity measure speci￿cations. We report the results for the most common combination found
in the literature.
24is rather distinct from the countries which are placed at the left and the middle of the
dendrogram. However, these groups can again be divided into two rather separated
subgroups. At the left we basically ￿nd the Continental countries (AT, FR, LU, BE,
DE, NL) which join a couple of Eastern European countries (CZ, SI, SK). In the
middle, we see the Nordic countries (DK, SE, NO) and the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Therefore from this hierarchical cluster analysis based on the redistributive e⁄ects
of tax bene￿t instruments measured by the standard accounting approach, the new
Eastern European member states do not form a clearly distinguished group from the
traditional European welfare states. Instead, the Baltic states show similar char-
acteristics as the Southern European countries and the Central Eastern European









































ATHU FRGR PT IT DE PL LUUK IE CY EE LT ES LV IS BENL CZ SK SI DK FI NO SE
Dendrogram for Shorrocks_Approach cluster analysis
Figure 6: Cluster Analysis of Redistributive E⁄ects based on Decomposition Ap-
proach
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC.
Second, we perform the cluster analysis on the basis of the inequality contribu-
tion of the di⁄erent tax bene￿t instruments as computed with the Shorrocks factor
source decomposition approach. Again we also control for the importance of the
pre-government income distribution and the economic weight of the di⁄erent com-
ponents. Figure 6 shows the dendrogram which presents the outcomes of this cluster
analysis. Now we see the Nordic countries on the very right which form a rather
25distinct group. This group is then joined by the Continental countries Belgium and
the Netherlands and the Eastern European countries Slovak and Czech Republic and
Slovenia. On the left we then ￿nd a rather mixed group of Continental, Southern
and Anglo-Saxon countries, joined by Hungary and Poland. Then, in the middle we
￿nd the Baltic countries, joined by Spain, Iceland and later Cyprus. Overall, the
cluster analysis based on the Shorrocks approach reveals the Baltic countries as a
rather distinguished group, still with similarities to at least two Southern European
countries (CY, ES). However, the Central Eastern European countries again seem to
very naturally group together with the traditional Western European welfare states.
To sum up, the welfare state clustering is robust for the Western European
countries. When using economic outcome indicators based on micro data, the welfare
state typology derived from the input oriented macro data approach of the political
sciences literature is con￿rmed. The new member states, however, do not form their
own cluster as suggested, e.g., by Deacon (2000), Ferge (2001) or Fenger (2007). Our
analysis con￿rms the view of Esping-Andersen (1996) that the di⁄erences between
these countries and the traditional welfare states are only of transitional nature.
Nonetheless, within the group of new member states, the Baltic countries form a
rather homogenous group which is completely in line with what one would expect
given the design of their ￿ at tax systems.
6 Conclusion
The enhancement of economic and social cohesion is a key target of EU policies.
Nonetheless, the descriptive evidence suggests that there are sizeable di⁄erences
across EU member states in the levels of within country income inequality - espe-
cially since the recent enlargement towards Eastern Europe. This holds true for
the inequality in disposable incomes as well as the inequality in pre-tax incomes,
hinting at the substantial variety in the national income tax bene￿t systems. From
a policy perspective, di⁄erences in the inequality of disposable incomes and, in par-
ticular, factors explaining these di⁄erences, including the tax and transfer system,
are of particular interest in order to evaluate the di⁄erent welfare state designs of
European countries. In this paper, we have evaluated the impact of di⁄erent tax
bene￿t instruments (income taxes, social contributions, pensions, transfers) on in-
come inequality and speci￿cally ask the question if the role of instruments di⁄ers
26across countries.
Our results reveal that according to the GE(2) standard accounting approach,
bene￿ts are the most important source of inequality reduction in most European
tax and transfer systems, taxes are less important. Also, public pensions play an
important role in lowering the inequality in disposable incomes, when comparing the
hypothetical situation without public pensions. The factor source decomposition
approach as suggested by Shorrocks, however, leads to very di⁄erent results: taxes
and social insurance contributions are by far the most important contributors to
income inequality and the contribution of bene￿ts is close to zero. Public pensions
even positively contribute to the inequality in disposable incomes in most countries.
An explanation for these partly contradictory results lies in the di⁄erent norm-
ative focus of the two approaches as discussed in Section 4.3. Furthermore, it can be
argued that many transfers have purposes other than income distribution. Whereas
taxes and social contributions are clearly correlated with income, transfers have a
much less clear e⁄ect on the income distribution, but they address other issues. This
is clearly illustrated by the almost negligible correlation between social bene￿ts and
disposable income. A clear negative correlation to disposable income can be found
only for some speci￿c transfers like means-tested bene￿ts for the long term unem-
ployed and bene￿ts for social exclusion; but these are only a small part of overall
transfers in most countries.
Furthermore, we performed a hierarchical cluster analysis to see in how far the
redistributive importance of tax bene￿t instruments di⁄ers across countries and par-
ticularly, how the new member states integrate in the group of traditional European
welfare states. First we ￿nd that although the country grouping slightly di⁄ers across
our two approaches, the overall results are quite robust. With regard to Western
Europe, we basically observe the ￿ typical￿welfare state clustering as suggested by
Esping-Andersen (1990) and later modi￿ed by Ferrera (1996). Particularly the Nor-
dic countries reveal very similar characteristics with regard to the redistributive
e⁄ects of their tax bene￿t instruments in both approaches. Also the Continental
and Southern European countries group together. However, as opposed to large
parts of the welfare state literature, we do not ￿nd the Eastern European countries
to be a clear distinguished group when we cluster according to the redistributive
importance of tax bene￿t instruments. This con￿rms the view of Esping-Andersen
(1996) that di⁄erences between East and West are only due to the transition period.
Instead, the Central Eastern European countries seem to naturally group together
27with the traditional Continental Western European welfare states. The Baltic ￿ at
tax countries are distinct from the other countries, but as the cluster analysis shows,
they still have some similarities to some Southern European countries. This ￿nding
seems plausible, since both, the Southern and Baltic countries can be characterized
by rather small welfare states compared to other European countries.
Note, however, that there are limitations to our analysis. First and most import-
antly, the analysis only assesses the direct e⁄ects of taxes and transfers on household
incomes. But, the tax system has both a direct e⁄ect on the post-government income
distribution and an indirect e⁄ect as it may also in￿ uence the pre-tax income dis-
tribution. However, any behavioral e⁄ects caused by redistributive policies are not
captured. Second, the study is static which means that the distribution of lifetime
incomes is not taken into account. Third, due to data limitations, we cannot account
for in-kind transfers or indirect taxes which have di⁄erent distributional impacts in
di⁄erent countries. This should be subject of future research when comparative data
on these elements become available.
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